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Abstract
This paper examines US safeguards applied to the motorcycle market in the 1980s. After
receiving temporary protection by means of a maximum tari⁄ of over 45%, Harley-Davidson
sales recovered dramatically. Simulations, based on structural demand and supply estimates,
indicate that while safeguard tari⁄s did bene￿t Harley-Davidson, they only account for a fraction
of its increased sales. This is primarily because consumers perceived that Harley-Davidson and
Japanese large motorcycles were poorly matched substitutes for each other. Our results provide
little evidence that safeguard provisions triggered restructuring in Harley-Davidson.
Keywords: Safeguard; Tari⁄; Random Coe¢ cient Discrete Choice Model; Motorcycles
JEL: F13; F14; L13; L68
1 Introduction
Ronald Reagan signed a recommendation from the US International Trade Commission (ITC) calling for ￿ve
years of new tari⁄s on heavyweight motorcycles in the period over the 1983￿ 1988 period. This tari⁄ relief,
called a safeguard or the escape clause, was intended to protect Harley-Davidson Motor Co. (hereafter,
￿H-D￿ ), the last remaining US motorcycle manufacturer, against Japanese imports. At that time, H-D was
in ￿nancial distress, with merely four percent of the market it had dominated in the early 1970s. The new
tari⁄s were scheduled to start at 49.4% of the wholesale price and decrease to 14.4% in the ￿fth year, while
Japanese manufacturers were allowed to ship the ￿rst 6000 cycles per year under the old 4.4% tari⁄, an
allowance that rose by 1000 units a year. After receiving temporary import relief starting in 1983, H-D
came back stronger than ever. Its sales increased dramatically at an annual rate of 10% from 1983 to 1990.
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1Indeed, H-D recovered so swiftly that it even requested that the ￿nal year of tari⁄ protection be cancelled.
The H-D motorcycle case is now heralded as a great success of safeguard protection.
Some, however, are more skeptical of the role of import relief in H-D￿ s turnaround. H-D produced mostly
heavyweight motorcycles with engine displacements of over 900 cc in the 1980s. Irwin (2002) argues that,
since the motorcycles imported from Japan were mostly medium-weight bikes in the range from 700￿ 850
cc range, they did not directly compete with H-D products. Reid (1990) documents how H-D saved itself
from bankruptcy. When H-D was under the ownership of AMF Incorporated,1 its bikes had a reputation for
unreliable mechanics: they leaked oil, vibrated, and could not match the performance of the smoothly running
Japanese bikes (Purkayastha, 1987). After H-D was bought by its management team and began operating
independently of AMF in 1981, it quickly overhauled its styles, spent more on research and development to
create new and more reliable models, and strengthened its marketing and distribution channels. In the critics￿
view, these managerial e⁄orts, not the import relief, had much to do with H-D￿ s turnaround. As safeguard
policy has attracted renewed attention amid the current surge of antidumping cases, it is imperative to
empirically resolve these con￿ icting views of the e⁄ectiveness of one of the most famous safeguard cases in
US history.2
This paper performs quantitative analyses to assess the extent to which US safeguard protection improved
H-D￿ s performance in the oligopolistic US motorcycle market in the 1980s. Since there seems no obvious
way to conduct controlled experiments regarding the motorcycle safeguard policy, we instead conduct coun-
terfactual simulations in the following two steps. First, use observed data along with an economic model to
recover estimated parameters of underlying economic primitives that are invariant to policy environment.
In this application, we estimate parameters of consumer demand and derive ￿rm marginal costs. The sec-
ond step involves using the model to simulate change in equilibrium outcomes resulting from change in the
availability of safeguard policy. Using the simulation method, we evaluate the e⁄ects of safeguard tari⁄s on
the US motorcycle market.
Our simulation results demonstrate that safeguard tari⁄s explain six percent on average, or thirteen
percent at most, of H-D￿ s sales and pro￿t recovery. The ￿nding of such a tiny safeguard e⁄ect is largely
due to estimates obtained from a random-coe¢ cient demand model, indicating that American and Japanese
motorcycles were a poorly matched substitutes for each other. The estimated small cross-price elasticities
appear consistent with the observation in our data that both H-D￿ s prices and sales increased at faster rates
than those of the Japanese motorcycles. Thus it is not surprising that safeguard tari⁄s would have had little
e⁄ect on shifting consumers from Japanese motorcycles to American ones. It is rather motorcycle non-price
attributes that must have played a major role in H-D￿ s turnaround. Indeed, this ￿nding is corroborated by
information reported in industry trade journals during the study period.
1AMF (formerly American Machine and Foundry) Incorporated acquired Harley-Davidson in 1969.
2Unlike antidumping and countervailing duties, safeguards do not require a ￿nding of an unfair trade practice, and generally
must be applied on a most-favored nation basis (see Bown, 2002, for details).
2The topic of safeguards has received little attention in the empirical literature evaluating trade policy.
The three exceptions to this pattern of neglect are Grossman￿ s (1986) study of the ITC￿ s investigation of
the steel industry, Pindyck and Rotemberg￿ s (1986) study of the US copper investigation, and Kelly￿ s (1988)
study of wood products in the United States. These three papers are all concerned with the ￿nal phase of
the ITC decision process, in which the ITC determines whether or not imports are the substantial cause of
injury to an industry. Since this paper conducts an ex post analysis of the e⁄ectiveness of the motorcycle
safeguard relief, it does not directly consider whether H-D was entitled to the relief; Such an analysis should
examine the period prior to safeguard implementation. Nevertheless, it is reasonable for us to infer from
the paper￿ s short-term simulation results that increased imports were unlikely a major cause of injury to
H-D. Indeed, the ITC￿ s protective actions may not have been warranted, because our demand estimates
demonstrate that the large Japanese motorcycles were not ￿like or directly competitive products￿ 3 with H-
D￿ s, indicating that American and Japanese motorcycles were poorly matched substitutes for each other in
the eyes of US consumers. Since H-D was not entitled to the escape clause, it would not have been plausible
that safeguard protection gave H-D breathing room in which to innovate, or upgrade its new motorcycles; in
fact, H-D upgraded its new motorcycles even in the absence of safeguard protection. This ￿nding suggests
that the coincidence between the period of safeguard relief and that of H-D￿ s recovery does not constitute
su¢ cient evidence of the e⁄ectiveness of the safeguard policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an overview of the US motorcycle
market, and presents descriptive statistics from our dataset. Examination of market-level data reveals a
distinctive feature of the market, namely, that H-D experienced increases in both the sales price and the
quantity sold in the safeguard period, whereas its Japanese counterparts increased their sales prices much
slower, while their quantities sold substantially decreased. The ￿nding that motorcycle prices played a
small role in H-D￿ s sales expansion casts doubt on the e⁄ectiveness of safeguard protection in promoting
H-D￿ s recovery. To quantitatively assess the extent to which US safeguard protection promoted H-D￿ s
recovery, subsequent sections present structural supply and demand model that describes the US motorcycle
market, and conduct counterfactual analyses. Section 3 employs a random-coe¢ cient discrete choice model
to estimate motorcycle demand in the US market. The methodology controls for endogeneity of price,
and allows for heterogeneity in individual consumer tastes. Combined with a supply-side model, Section 4
conducts simulation analyses by asking what would have happened to H-D￿ s sales in the absence of safeguard
protection. For this simulation approach to be successful, the model used for the exercise must closely
approximate the economic environment under study, and the policy of interest must be exogenous to the
environment. The section examines several sensitivity analyses and discusses the robustness of our obtained
results to alternative speci￿cations, including supply-side behavior. Section 5 concludes, followed by data
3Cited from Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. The similar phrase can also be found in Article XIX, paragraph 1a of the
GATT.
3appendix.
2 Overview of the US Motorcycle Market
Through the 1950s, H-D was the traditional leader in the US motorcycle market. The situation changed,
however, with the entrance of Japanese motorcycle manufacturers in the 1960s, selling only motorcycles of
250 cc or smaller engines. These lightweight bikes quickly gained a reputation for high quality and advanced
technology. By 1965, the US market was dominated by lightweight motorcycles, with Honda controlling 85%
of the market. Indeed, Honda￿ s sales leapt from USD 500,000 in 1960 to USD 77 million by 1965. Initially,
this dramatic shift in the market was not perceived as a threat by H-D, the sole surviving American-owned
motorcycle ￿rm: its heavyweight motorcycle segment was left uninvaded, and the segment was moreover
expanding. However, when the lightweight market was successfully under their control, Japanese producers
then ventured into the market with larger engine capacities, thereby competing directly with H-D in the
United States. Japanese launching of heavyweight bikes grew intense as Kawasaki and Honda opened plants
in Nebraska in 1974 and Ohio in 1979, respectively, to produce heavyweight motorcycles. By the end of 1981,
H-D fell to a distant ￿fth place with a mere ￿ve percent of the US motorcycle market, following Honda (38%),
Yamaha (25%), Kawasaki (16%), and Suzuki (14%); the remaining market share belonged, for example, to
BMW.
H-D had long attributed its declining sales to lower-priced Japanese imports. Sharp increases in Japanese
imports in the early 1980s, along with the 1981￿ 1982 recession, led to the accumulation of a large stockpile
of inventory for both the American and Japanese companies. As a result, H-D sought tari⁄ protection in
1982, claiming that the inventories caused by the substantial increases in Japanese imports threatened serious
injury to the American company. This was H-D￿ s second attempt to seek tari⁄protection, following its failed
antidumping complaint ￿led in 1978. Note that antidumping protection is designed to respond to actions
deemed improper, and therefore a less rigorous standard of injury is thought appropriate than in the case of
safeguards. Given that H-D￿ s antidumping petition had been rejected four years earlier and that the situation
had changed little since then, the chance of safeguards being granted was regarded as slim. To the surprise
of H-D, however, the ITC approved the safeguard petition, and the Reagan administration accepted the
ITC￿ s recommendation that a tari⁄-rate quota be imposed on imports of motorcycles with 700 cc and larger
engines from April 1983 to March 1988. Reid (1990: 89) explained that the Reagan administration intended
this safeguard measure to be a warning to Japanese carmakers that they were vulnerable to similar actions.
Since the safeguard under study had not really been expected by the motorcycle companies, including H-D,
it is natural to regard it as exogenously imposed on the US motorcycle market.
The safeguard was implemented in the form of a tari⁄-rate quota, which allowed a certain number of
motorcycles to be imported under the normal tari⁄ rate of 4.4 percent, while imports above the number had
4to pay the higher protective tari⁄s.4 The quotas in 1983 were set at 6000 units for Japan, 5000 units for
West Germany (where BMW was located), and 4000 units for imports from all other countries: these levels
were scheduled to increase each year of the relief period. The new tari⁄ rates were set at 49.4 percent for
the initial year, declined over the ￿ve years, and then returned to the normal level.
As indicated in Figure 1, US imports of larger motorcycles, against which H-D sought protection dropped
by half when the highest tari⁄ was implemented in 1983. Interestingly, these imports continued to decline
over the safeguard period as the tari⁄-rate quota eased toward 1987. While the decline in the number of
imported motorcycles was largely due to the decrease in US motorcycle sales in this period, two other events
may also account for it. One is that the Japanese may have exported more motorcycles with smaller engine
displacements, to evade the tari⁄-rate quota and be able to import under the normal duty. Table 1 presents
US motorcycle sales of H-D and Japanese motorcycles broken down by engine displacement. The data are
from R. L. Polk, archived in the US Library of Congress, and the coverage is limited to the 1983￿ 1987 period.
The table indicates that Japanese manufacturers indeed appear to have responded to the safeguard action,
as the sales share of Japanese motorcycles with engines 699 cc or smaller jumped from 43 percent to over
60 percent in 1983. The increase in sales mostly represents substitution for the decrease in sales of Japanese
medium-sized motorcycles in the 700￿ 1099 cc range, while overall Japanese sales declined. The change in the
sales composition by engine displacement cannot be entirely accounted for by motorcycle prices, given that
average prices of Japanese medium-sized motorcycles dropped more than those of the smaller-sized ones.
Another factor that may have contributed to the decrease in US imports is that, since the higher tari⁄s
did not apply to domestic production, foreign producers, namely Honda and Kawasaki, gradually shifted
production to the United States. While the availability of data on US domestic production by Japanese
motorcycle companies is limited 5, in Section 3 we discuss an implication of such local production for our
estimation results.
The tari⁄-rate quota a⁄ected not only on the quantities of imports and sales, but also motorcycle prices.
Figure 2 shows the average prime retail prices of H-D and Japanese motorcycles. Prime retail prices are
known to closely re￿ ect transaction prices, and thus di⁄er from manufacturer￿ s suggested prices. The data are
available from the National Automotive Dealers Association for the 1977￿ 1987 period. The price data in the
￿gure are in constant 1983 USD. For each of the three motorcycle categories, we averaged the model prices,
weighting by the numbers of each model sold each year. Notably, the prices of the Japanese motorcycles
subject to higher tari⁄s did not increase, but appeared to have decreased, in the ￿rst two years of the
safeguard period. In fact, H-D￿ s prices remained more than 80% higher and increased at a rate much
faster than did those of its Japanese counterparts. This observation might have been accounted for by
4Prior to 1994 when the Uruguay Round was concluded, quantitative restrictions, including quotas and tari⁄-rate quotas,
were a common safeguard measure.
5The only information we are aware of is that US production capacity of Honda￿ s Ohio plant increased from 40,000 units in
1977 (Global and Mail, 28 September 1978) to 70,000 units in 1983 (New York Times, 10 January 1984).
5the aftermath of the large inventories accumulated by the Japanese manufacturers in 1981 and 1982, as
mentioned earlier in this section. According to the USITC (1984), the inventory of Japanese motorcycles
with engine displacements larger than or equal to 700 cc was 130,000 units at the beginning of 1983 ￿ a
substantial volume, given that Japanese motorcycle sales were only 170,000 units that year. This supply
glut would have had an even greater impact on larger-sized Japanese motorcycles. Japanese prices began to
increase in 1985 when the Plaza Accord was signed. Prices of Japanese motorcycles in both size categories
increased with the devaluation of USD, the rate of price increase averaging 10 percent, over 50 percent faster
than that of H-D￿ s. This observation indicates that Japanese motorcycle prices in the 1980s were largely
determined by the prices of imports, and probably less by the local US production of Honda and Kawasaki.
Combining the ￿ndings presented in Figure 2 and Table 1, we found that H-D experienced increases in
both sales prices and quantities in the safeguard period. In the meantime, the Japanese companies increased
their prices much more slowly than did H-D, while their sales quantities substantially decreased in 1983 and
thereafter. These market-level data indicate that H-D￿ s recovery was not entirely due to safeguard tari⁄s,
because motorcycle prices did not appear to play a major role in H-D￿ s sales expansion. It is rather more
natural to think that non-price characteristics of H-D￿ s motorcycles, for example, quality and reliability,
may have played a larger role in the recovery. Indeed, after it was bought by its management and became
independent of AMF in 1981, H-D quickly overhauled and renovated its production system. It implemented
a statistical control system that prompted employees to judge the quality of their own output, and a just-
in-time inventory program (which H-D called the ￿material-as-needed program￿ ) that improved production
e¢ ciency; in addition, there were massive layo⁄s that halved the workforce. As a result, H-D reduced the
percentage of defective bikes from approximately 50% to less than 2% (Advertising Age, August 10, 1987: S-
27). H-D also created a new engine￿ ￿Evolution￿￿ which was more reliable than its old V-twin engine. Reid
(1990) documents how the introduction of this new engine helped expand sales of H-D￿ s large motorcycles,
particularly those with an engine displacement of 1340 cc, the H-D￿ s best-selling motorcycle category.
One simple indicator that may re￿ ect the degree of H-D￿ s innovativeness in management and production
aspects is the number of new motorcycle models it introduced. Since the outcome of such innovation is
normally embodied in new goods, it seems reasonable to regard this indicator as related to some aspects of
the innovation we just described. A casual observation of the indicator presented in Figure 3 reveals that
H-D appeared to become innovative during the safeguard period. Prior to safeguard protection, H-D rolled
out half the number of new models of similar engine sizes of its Japanese counterparts; once the protection
was in place, however, the number of new H-D models doubled in three years, while the number of new
Japanese models stagnated.
In the next section, we examine consumer transaction behavior in the US motorcycle market, and seek
further insight into the structure of motorcycle demand and its role in H-D￿ s recovery.
63 Choice Model of the US Motorcycle Market
This section describes the estimation model we use to explain the US motorcycle market. In Section 3.1, we
introduce a demand system, derived from a random-coe¢ cient discrete choice model of consumer behavior.
We estimate American demand for motorcycles at the model level, incorporating important dimensions of
motorcycle attributes. Since we do not observe the individual purchasing behavior, we aggregate across
individual buyers to obtain the demand for a motorcycle model, while still allowing for heterogeneity across
consumers. Section 3.2 addresses the endogeneity issue and introduces instruments used in the estimation,
and Section 3.3 discusses the estimation results of the demand model presented here. The demand model
and its estimates provide a basis for the analyses in Section 4, in which we assess the e⁄ectiveness of the
safeguard policy implemented in the 1983￿ 1987 period.
3.1 Discrete Choice Model
This subsection describes a random-coe¢ cient discrete choice model of new motorcycle demand. In any
particular year, we take the existing owner of a 450 cc or larger engine size motorcycle as the purchasing
entity, where each owner has a unit demand for a new motorcycle model. We denote the market size by
M.6 Each consumer i is assumed to maximize the following indirect utility function at time t by choosing












￿ ￿jt + ￿ijt + ￿ijt;
where uijt is consumer i￿ s utility from consuming the model j at time t. The vector xjt is motorcycle model
j￿ s observed attributes at time t, including the constant and time-control variables. The k-th component
of this vector is denoted by xjkt. Motorcycle characteristics are incorporated in xjt. We use in this vector
the variables of engine displacement, dry weight (that is, motorcycle weight with an empty gasoline tank),
the number of forward speeds, and the number of cylinders. The model age variable, which counts the
years elapsed after the market introduction of the model, is also included to separate the e⁄ects of new and
older motorcycles. We include a dummy variable speci￿c to H-D, in an attempt to control for unmeasured
characteristics, such as perceived reliability or prestige attached to H-D, but not to foreign motorcycles. We
6We tested an alternative measure of market size to use U.S. households as the possible market size. Note that the motorcycle
owners accounted for less than 10 percent of U.S. households in our study period. We used the Current Population Survey
to construct an income variable. The demand estimates reported in Section 4 are robust to this alternative de￿nition of the
market size.
7Note that more than 90 percent of the existing owners chose the outside option.
7interact this H-D dummy with the trend variable to allow for the taste on H-D to change with time. The
utility function contains ￿jt, an unobserved (to an econometrician) product quality of motorcycle model




= 0. In Section 3.2, we discuss the econometric endogeneity problem
generated by ￿jt. Note that xjt￿ + ￿jt, where ￿ is a set of parameters to be estimated, is common to all
consumers. The sum of the ￿rst two terms on the right-hand side of (1) re￿ ects the mean level of utility
across consumers who purchase model j and are denoted by ￿jt.
To enable richer substitution patterns, we follow Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) and allow di⁄erent
consumers to have di⁄erent intensities of preferences for di⁄erent motorcycle characteristics.8 We rely on
a random-coe¢ cient utility speci￿cation and include the third and fourth terms on the right-hand side of
(1). These terms can be considered as the deviation of the mean utility, and are denoted by ￿ijt. For each
characteristic of xjt, consumer i has a taste ￿ik, which is assumed to be drawn from an i.i.d. standard
normal distribution. The parameter to be estimated, ￿k, captures the variance in the consumer taste for
characteristic xjkt.
The term ￿i is consumer i￿ s sensitivity to changes in real price, pj (in 1983 constant USD). Using the
idea from Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999), we assume that the distribution of ￿i varies with income, and
takes the form of ￿i = ￿=yi, where yi is the i-th component of consumer income, y, and ￿ is a parameter
to be estimated. Price sensitivity is thus modeled as inversely related to income. While we lack data on
individual consumer income, the income distribution for US motorcycle owners is well approximated by the
log-normal density distribution, dG(y), with the mean and variance of the distribution being estimated based
on data available a 1985 publication of the Motorcycle Industry Council (MIC). 9 Consumers with similar
demographic attributes tend to have similar rankings of products and thus similar substitution patterns.
The inclusion of ￿ijt in (1) allows for correlation between motorcycles with similar characteristics, and thus
presumably for realistic substitution patterns relative to the traditional logit model.
The outside good in our model, the consequence of not purchasing a motorcycle, includes alternatives such
as buying used motorcycles and using public transport. Although it is not possible to distinguish between
changes in the constant term in (1) or between changes in the mean and variance in consumer tastes for the
outside good, the constant term in ￿ijt does allow us to control for possible bias due to the existence of the
outside good. Let ￿ij represent the idiosyncratic taste of consumer i for product j, and follow the type-I
extreme value. This distributional assumption yields the following closed-form probability of consumer i￿ s
choosing brand j;
8Other papers that applies a discrete choice model on aggregate market-level data to assess the e⁄ectiveness of trade policies
include Brambilla (2004), Clerides (2008), and Ohashi (2005). Unlike this paper, these three papers do not allow for random
coe¢ cients in the demand speci￿cation.
9The mean and variance of the log-normal distribution of motorcycle owner income are estimated as 24,487 and 15,434 (in
terms of 1983 constant USD), respectively. Those of U.S. households, estimated from the Current Population Survey, take
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where dF (￿) represents the joint normal density of taste shocks, ￿, the (i;k)-th component of which is ￿ik
introduced in (1). We make the independence assumption in dF (￿) and dG(y), and follow the estimation
methods detailed in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995); we use an inversion routine to solve for the vector
of unobserved quality, ￿jt, and form a generalized method of moment (GMM) estimator. The population
moment condition is a product of ￿jt and instrumental variables introduced in the next subsection. We
numerically compute the market shares and ￿jt by means of the inversion. Using instruments discussed
below, we compute the estimates from the two-step GMM estimation. We follow Nevo (2000) for the
numerical search technique and for the construction of standard errors.
3.2 Instruments
Following the literature (see, for example, Berry, 1994), we assume that xj and ￿j are not correlated with one
another (we omit the time subscript unless there is confusion). This is a central identi￿cation assumption
for the demand estimation. This assumption may not be accurate in that observed characteristics may
be positively correlated with brand image or other attributes for which we lack data. Nevertheless, the
assumption helps greatly by reducing the number of instruments needed in the estimation.
We are concerned that the variable of price may possibly be correlated with the error, ￿j. It is likely
that the observed characteristics may not capture all important motorcycle functions; indeed, ￿j is often
interpreted as the unobserved quality error. If ￿j is correctly perceived by consumers and sellers in the
market, this unobserved quality error is likely correlated with price: Better-quality motorcycles may induce
higher willingness to pay, and sellers may be able to charge higher prices due to higher marginal costs or
oligopolistic market power.
In a product di⁄erentiation model with exogenous characteristics, the characteristics of other ￿rms are
appropriate instruments. With market power in supply, the markup of each model depends on the distance
from its neighbors in the characteristics space. The characteristics of other products are thus related to pj,
but since characteristics are assumed to be exogenous, they are valid instruments. We include in the set
of instruments the sum of the characteristics of other motorcycle models o⁄ered by the ￿rm, and that of
models o⁄ered by competing ￿rms; These variables may be negatively correlated with the price.10
10The same set of instruments are used by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) and Ohashi (2002, 2003), among others.
9Traditionally, cost variables excluded from xj are used as an instruments in homogeneous-goods models,
and this practice is still appropriate here. For such an instrument, we employ JPY-USD exchange rates from
International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1988). Since many motorcycles sold in the USA were imports,
the US motorcycle price should have been a⁄ected by the JPY-USD exchange rate. Note, however, that the
instrument is an industry aggregate, and does not vary by motorcycle model: the use of the instrument thus
only helps identify the motorcycle demand through the variation of the instrument over time.
3.3 Demand Estimates
This subsection presents estimation results of the demand model. The data used for the estimation cover the
1983￿ 1987 period on a tri-annual basis; data on motorcycle units sold are available only for this period and
at this frequency. We describe the data sources in detail in Data Appendix. Table 2 shows three estimation
results. Models 2-1 and 2-2 are based on a logit model, in which we allow for no heterogeneity in individual
preferences. Thus, in these models, ￿ijt in (1) becomes ￿pjt. The model 2-1 uses the ordinary least squared
(OLS) method, whereas model 2-2 employs the set of instruments discussed in the previous section. The
two-stage least squared (2SLS) method is used to control for possible endogeneity of the motorcycle price.
Finally, model 2-3 estimates the full random-coe¢ cient model discussed in Section 3.1.
It is known that the 2SLS method can produce severely biased estimates if the instruments are weak. We
thus check the explanatory power of the instruments, conditional on the included exogenous variables in the
￿rst stage of the method. We obtain an F-statistic for the endogenous variable and report this in the table.
We ￿nd that the instruments used in the paper are not weak at the 99% con￿dence level of F-statistics. The
coe¢ cients estimated under model 2-2 are obtained by regressing the dependent variable onto the exogenous
and ￿tted value of the price variable.
Model 2-1 does not ￿t the data well; the R-squared measure indicates that 35% of the variation is ex-
plained by the model. The price coe¢ cient is both economically and statistically signi￿cant. Although many
coe¢ cients are estimated to be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, we are concerned that endogeneity in prices
may lead to a correlation between the price and the unobserved error. If the price is responsive to the
unobserved quality, the resulting bias in the price coe¢ cient could be severe. The rest of the speci￿cations
account for this bias. We use the instruments introduced in Section 3.2 to control for endogeneity of the
motorcycle price. Since we have more instruments than we need to identify an equation, we can test whether
the additional instruments are uncorrelated with the error by using the J-statistic (i.e., the statistic for
overidentifying restrictions). The J-statistic reported in model 2-3 does not allow us to reject the orthog-
onality condition between some of the instruments and the error at the 90 percent con￿dence level. The
price estimate reported under model 2-2 indicates the successful elimination of endogeneity in the positive
correlation with the unobserved quality.
Engine displacement and dry weight are major characteristics of a motorcycle, as they represent the
10degree of stability in riding. The two variables are closely related, with the correlation coe¢ cient being
0.845. The signi￿cance in the estimated mean coe¢ cients appear to re￿ ect the consumer perception of
engine size and dryweight. These variables also serve as a proxy for motorcycle luxuriousness, including
the seat comfort. Consumers also seem to care for the number of forward speeds, which is considered as
another dimension of motorcycle quality. As an unmeasured quality could presumably make certain models
survive in the market, the age coe¢ cient may partially capture this unmeasured quality di⁄erence among
the surviving models. Being conditioned by ￿j, the age coe¢ cient may be appropriately interpreted as the
rate of obsolescence. The estimated coe¢ cient indicates that one more year of obsolescence is the loss of
USD 114 (in 1983 constant prices), approximately three percent of the average motorcycle price in the study
period. The coe¢ cients of the seasonal (more precisely, tri-annual) dummy variables (not reported in the
table) indicate that summer is high season and winter is low.
The estimated coe¢ cients of the H-D dummy, including the interaction terms with the trend variable,
are found not statistically signi￿cant, but economically indicate that consumers became more attracted to
H-D over time. The sum of the mean value in consumer perception on both observed and unobserved
characteristics (i.e., ￿jt, where j is H-D) generally increased from 2.96 in 1983 to 3.44 in 1987.11 This ￿nding
appears to be consistent with the information shown in Figure 1: H-D￿ s sales expanded among the declining
US motorcycle market over the 1983￿ 1987 period.
Model 2-3 reports the estimates of the random-coe¢ cient demand model, derived from (1). We allow for
the variables for engine displacement, the H-D dummy, and the constant term to have random coe¢ cients.
We also incorporate an income e⁄ect by dividing price by sampled individual income, as described in Section
3.1. Thus, the magnitude of the estimated price coe¢ cient is not comparable to those found in the previous
two models. Based on the ￿nding of the endogenous price coe¢ cient in model 2-1, we apply the instruments
in the estimation of this model. The estimated own-price elasticities in the mean take values similar to those
found in model 2-2.
It is reasonable that the random coe¢ cient of engine displacement is estimated to be signi￿cant. The esti-
mate might indicate that individual consumers had di⁄erent tastes regarding di⁄erent engine displacements.
This ￿nding seems to make sense for consumer purchases of motorcycles: some consumers buy heavyweight
motorcycles intended for long trips, while others prefer medium-sized motorcycles for getting around the city.
The estimated random coe¢ cient of the constant term, though statistically insigni￿cant, might imply that
consumers￿heterogenous responses to the outside good may play a role in the demand for new motorcycles.
Notably, the coe¢ cient of the H-D dummy is estimated to be statistically signi￿cant in the standard
deviation. The estimate indicates that consumers had diverse tastes regarding di⁄erent H-D models, leading
us to infer that the demand substitution between H-D and Japanese motorcycles was not large.
Using the obtained price estimate from model 2-3, we present in Table 3 a sample of estimated own-
11We calculate the values on the basis of model 2-3. The ￿nding is much stronger when we use the estimates from model 2-2.
11and cross-price elasticities. The table lists two bestselling models from 1983 for each of the ￿ve engine-
displacement categories shown in Table 1. Note that, since H-D had no small-size motorcycles, this table
shows four H-D and six Japanese motorcycle models. The (m;n) element in the elasticities matrix indicates
the elasticity of model n with respect to a change in the price of m. While the logit model restricts all
elasticities within a row of the matrix to be equal, a random coe¢ cient model allows these elasticities to di⁄er
according to di⁄erences in the price sensitivity between consumers that purchase the various motorcycles.
The table indicates that while own elasticities for all models take more than one in absolute values, cross-
price elasticities are found generally small, and asymmetric between American and Japanese motorcycles.
The estimated elasticities of H-D sales with respect to Japanese motorcycle prices tend to be larger than
those of Japanese sales with respect to H-D prices. Indeed, Table 3, which lists only the selected models,
shows that the average value of the former is 0.032, whereas the value of the latter is 0.006. The ￿nding
of small and asymmetric cross-price elasticities between American and Japanese motorcycles corroborates
our observations using the market-level data presented in Table 1 and Figure 2: H-D experienced increases
in both prices and sales in the safeguard period, while the Japanese manufacturers increased their prices
much more slowly and their sales quantities substantially decreased. The ￿nding in the estimated elasticities
is also consistent with anecdotal evidence found in external sources. In 1983, customers loyal to H-D led
to form a motorcycle club called HOG (namely, Harley Owners Group), and organized events to promote
H-D motorcycle use and encouraged its executives to participate. As reported in New York Times, ￿Harley
enjoyed the advantage of an especially loyal following among motorcycle a￿ctionados who often regard the
lower-cost Japanese models as imitations, however advanced they are technically￿(March 18, 1987).
Based on the ￿ndings in Table 3, we anticipate that safeguard protection played an essential role in H-D￿ s
recovery in 1983, at least from a short-term perspective. In the next section, we conduct simulation analyses
and assess the extent to which safeguard protection promoted H-D￿ s sales.
4 Measuring the E⁄ect of the Safeguard Protection
Did the import relief implemented in the 1983￿ 1987 period rescue H-D from the brink of bankruptcy? Or
did H-D save itself on its own without much help from the relief? This section answers the question. Based
on the demand estimates reported in the previous section, this section measures the impact of safeguard
protection on H-D by asking what would have happened to the company￿ s sales had no such provision been
provided. We examine the price e⁄ect of tari⁄s, leaving long-term strategies, such as changes in motorcycle
characteristics, constant. This exercise requires a supply model in order to analyze the equilibrium responses
in motorcycle competition in the United States. This section ￿rst introduces such a model, and then describes
the simulation strategy.
124.1 Supply Model of the US Motorcycle Market
Calculating the equilibrium under counterfactual scenarios requires a supply model describing the behavior
of motorcycle companies in the United States. We construct a motorcycle company￿ s pro￿t maximization
problem, and solve the ￿rst-order condition. We assume that American and Japanese companies compete
over price in supplying US customers with motorcycles of di⁄erentiated attributes. As indicated in Table 1,
the companies manufactured over 30 models in a given year. We thus consider a multi-product di⁄erentiated
Bertrand model. We examine the robustness of our estimates to this supply-model assumption in the next
section.
As seen in Figure 2, the maximum protective tari⁄of 49.4 percent was implemented during the safeguard
period. As discussed in Section 2, however, some Japanese motorcycles of over 700 cc engine size escaped
the high safeguard tari⁄ rates in at least three ways. One way was by the quota: since the safeguard was
in the form of a tari⁄-rate quota, a certain number of large motorcycles were subject to the normal tari⁄
of 4.4 percent. The second was domestic production. Honda and Kawasaki began independently shifting
production to the USA in the 1970s: domestically produced motorcycles were free of customs duties, and
thus of safeguard tari⁄s. Finally some motorcycles, especially those sold at the beginning of the safeguard
period, were likely to have been imported before the safeguard tari⁄s were applied.12
An accurate description of the behavior of Japanese motorcycle companies entails incorporating their
responses to the tari⁄s described above. While it is evident from Figure 1 that the import volume was large
enough for the safeguard protection to be e⁄ective, the available information contained in our dataset is
insu¢ cient for us to examine the mechanism by which Japanese makers allocated their distribution channels
between quota, domestic production, and inventory. In this paper, we thus forgo a complete characterization
of supplier behavior; instead, we assume that all Japanese models with engine displacements exceeding 699
cc were subject to the higher safeguard tari⁄ rates shown in Figure 2. This treatment clearly overstates
the e⁄ect of safeguard protection, because we assume that US production of Japanese models was subject
to safeguard tari⁄s, though it was actually exempt from them. To anticipate the result in Section 4.2., we
￿nd that safeguard provisions had little e⁄ect on H-D￿ s sales, even if we ignore the existence of quota, local
production, and inventory accumulated by the Japanese.
Consider the situation where ￿rm f (= 1;:::;F) chooses prices for a set of its motorcycles, Jf, in order
to maximize the ensuing pro￿t with respect to the set of prices, fpjgj2Jf. The time script is omitted here if
there is no confusion. We focus on the seller￿ s pricing decision, and regard as exogenous to the analysis the
decision as to which motorcycles (i.e., bundles of characteristics) are produced each year.
12As discussed in the previous section, the accumulation of inventory prior to safeguard imposition was not likely prompted








￿ M ￿ sj;
where the tari⁄ rate on model j is denoted by ￿j, and the constant marginal cost of model j is denoted by
mcj. Note that under our assumption, the safeguard tari⁄ rates are applied to Japanese motorcycles of the
700 cc or larger engine size, and the normal tari⁄ rate of 0.044 to other Japanese motorcycles. No tari⁄s
are applied to H-D. The quantity sold for model j is represented by M ￿ sj, already de￿ned in the previous






























































￿1 ￿ s(p) + D ￿ B (p) ￿
￿
(1 + ￿)
￿1 ￿ p ￿ mc
￿
= 0;
where p ￿ (p1;:::;pJ)0, s ￿ (s1::::;sJ)0, and mc ￿ (mc1::::;mcJ)0. The tari⁄-rate vector, (1 + ￿)
￿1, is
de￿ned as diag( 1
1+￿1::::; 1
1+￿J ). The ownership matrix is D, in which the (a;b) element takes a value of
1 if models a and b are marketed by the same ￿rm and 0 otherwise. For example, under the assumption
of collusion, all the models are supposed to be marketed by a single ￿rm, and thus the ownership matrix
becomes the identity matrix. Note that sj is presented as a fraction of the total number of motorcycle
owners, including non-purchasers.
The entry and exit of models make the size of B change over time. Each element of B is calculated
from the probability formula de￿ned in (2). Note that the cross derivatives di⁄er, depending on consumer
attributes v and y. Each component of B can be computed by the demand estimates. Thus, using the data
and the obtained demand estimates presented in Table 2, we simply solve (3) to obtain marginal costs of
motorcycle models.
The marginal costs for all motorcycle models recovered from (3) are found positive. Based on the limited
information available in the trade journal, we consider that these estimates are within a reasonable range.
Our marginal-cost estimates for motorcycles sold in 1987 indicate that H-D cost USD 6,008 on average,
while Japanese models of corresponding engine sizes cost USD 3,440. These estimates are comparable to
the information found in an article of the New York Times, reporting ￿Harley￿ s cycles cost from $4,000 to
more than $10,000 and are up to 50 percent more expensive than competitive Japanese models,￿(March 18,
1987). This evidence would provide us with additional credence on our marginal-cost estimates.
In the following counterfactual analysis sections, we use the demand equation (2) and supply equation
(3) along with the obtained marginal costs to solve for equilibrium prices and market shares at the level of
14motorcycle model by time t. Model sales are calculated by multiplying the market share by the potential
market size, M.
4.2 Impact of Safeguard Policy
In this section, we examine the impact of the motorcycle safeguard policy. We assume that all Japanese
motorcycles with 699 cc or larger engines were imported at the normal tari⁄ rate of 4.4 percent, the same
tari⁄ rate that applied to motorcycles below 700 cc in engine size, and calculate ￿rm sales and prices
using the new equilibrium for each period. This assumption should not change the nature of the supply and
demand equations described in the previous sections, because, as discussed in Section 2, safeguard protection
appeared exogenous to the evolution of the US motorcycle market in the 1983￿ 1987 period.
In the simulation exercise, we replace, with the normal tari⁄ rate, all occurrences of ￿jt in equation (3)
that receive the values of high safeguard tari⁄s. Since some Japanese motorcycles were either imported
under quota or domestically manufactured, the simulation result is likely to overstate the short-term impact
of the motorcycle safeguard protection. We use the estimates of Model 2-3 shown in Table 2 to compute
the equilibrium sales volume and price by model for each period t of the study period. Estimated values are
used for the model error, ￿jt, on the right-hand side of (1).
Table 4 presents annual comparison between the simulated and actual prices by make and engine size. The
simulated prices are calculated under the assumption of multi-product di⁄erentiated Bertrand competition
described in the previous subsection. The prices are then aggregated by year, weighting by sales volume.
The table indicates that, as intended, safeguard protection would have increased the prices of Japanese
motorcycles of large engine displacement: the actual prices in 1983 were over 20 percent higher on average
than the simulated prices assuming no safeguards. The di⁄erences between the actual and simulated prices
of the large Japanese motorcycles declined in general, as the safeguard tari⁄s were phased out toward 1987.13
Note that the prices would not have increased by the magnitude of the safeguard tari⁄rates shown in Figure
2, as the own-price elasticities presented in Table 3 are found to be elastic. Motorcycles unsheltered by
protection were in￿ uenced little by the tari⁄s: the calculated price changes are as small as merely a ￿fth of
one percent for H-D￿ s and small Japanese motorcycles. The small spillover e⁄ect of the tari⁄s may have been
re￿ ected by our ￿nding of small cross-price elasticities reported in Table 3. In comparison with the values of
the own-elasticities, the cross-price elasticities are estimated to be small, in particular, of H-D demand with
respect to Japanese motorcycle prices.
Table 5 presents the e⁄ects of safeguard tari⁄s on sales and pro￿ts of the motorcycle companies by year:
the upper half of the table shows the results of H-D, and the bottom half presents those of the Japanese
makers. Actual sales in the table are taken from Table 1, while actual pro￿ts are calculated based on the
13The e⁄ect on prices appears smaller in 1983 than in 1984, because the safeguard was implemented in the second quarter of
1983, so its e⁄ect was not fully re￿ected in the 1983 prices.
15marginal cost estimates obtained in Section 4.1. The fourth and ￿fth columns of Table 5 present the price
e⁄ect of safeguard protection on sales and pro￿ts. We assume that American and Japanese companies
competed in the Bertrand fashion, and we construct the standard error for the policy e⁄ect using a Monte
Carlo method: we have generated 1000 draws from the asymptotic normal distribution for the demand
estimates and standard errors, and then computed 1000 pairs of sales and pro￿ts for Bertrand competition.
The table indicates that the safeguard tari⁄s would have reduced Japanese sales and pro￿t by 48 and 50
percent, respectively, but at marginal signi￿cance levels. Notably, H-D does not appear to have bene￿tted
much from safeguard protection, even though its sales recovered dramatically in 1983. Indeed, our simulation
results reveal that safeguard tari⁄s accounted for merely six percent of H-D￿ s sales and pro￿ts, or 13 percent
of them on the basis of the upper bound of 95% con￿dence interval.
This simulated e⁄ect is obtained under the assumption of Bertrand-type competition. We investigate
the robustness of our results to an alternative assumption that the safeguard protection induced Japanese
￿rms to collude. This thought experiment changes the ￿rst-order condition in equation (3), in that all the
Japanese ￿rms instead act like a single multiproduct supplier. The marginal costs are obtained based on
this alternative supply-side assumption. The sixth and seventh columns in Table 5 show that the estimated
impact of the policy on H-D is quite similar to the base estimates reported in the fourth and ￿fth columns.
The di⁄erence is indeed within the range of one-standard deviation of the base estimates.
The ￿ndings reported in Table 5 provide us with an intriguing insight into whether the safeguard pro-
tection of H-D was warranted. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 sets out the conditions under which
safeguard actions can be implemented in the United States. Under Section 201, after receiving a petition
from a domestic industry, the ITC is required to conduct an investigation to ￿determine whether an article
is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious
injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive with
the imported article.￿
The paper￿ s ￿nding of the small short-term tari⁄e⁄ect leads us to doubt whether imports caused ￿serious
injury￿to H-D in the 1980s. This is primarily because our demand estimation results reported in Section
3.3 indicate that H-D motorcycles were unlikely to be in a ￿directly competitive￿relationship with Japanese
motorcycles, when restricting our focus to larger engine displacement. The small cross-price elasticities
between American and Japanese motorcycles indicate that safeguard tari⁄s would have had little e⁄ect on
shifting consumers from Japanese motorcycles to American ones. Nevertheless, as shown in Table 5, H-D did
have a pecuniary incentive to seek for safeguards, if H-D￿ s ￿ling cost for the petition was not too excessive.
It is often argued that trade protection provides ￿rms with time and resources, stimulating their inno-
vation and thereby letting them compete e⁄ectively with foreign rivals. Any such trade measures should be
temporary, because permanent protection reduces incentives for domestic ￿rms to invest in new technologies
and products. This line of reasoning has been cited in favoring protection for infant as well as senescent
16industries, and explained by theoretical research, including that of Miyagiwa and Ohno (1999). Our ￿nding
on the cross-price elasticities also implies that it was not the four-year safeguard protection that would have
likely stimulated H-D to upgrade its motorcycle models. As detailed in Section 2, according to Reid (1990),
H-D changed its management and committed itself to research and development activities in 1981. At that
time, given the results of its antidumping petition, H-D was unlikely to foresee that safeguard protection
would be in place two years later. The product development e⁄orts led H-D to its successful launch of new
motorcycles with 883-cc engines, and its swift sales recovery as shown in Figure 1.
Rigorous examination of whether H-D was entitled to the escape clause should use data from before
the implementation of the safeguard policy and examine factors other than imports that might have caused
injury to H-D.14 Although such ex ante data are unavailable in this analysis, the ex post analysis made in
this section illustrates that the coincidence of higher imports and lower domestic activity may not constitute
su¢ cient evidence that imports have caused injury, even though ￿increased imports￿and ￿serious injury￿
are observed facts in Figure 1. The ITC presumably failed to ascertain the lack of demand substitutability
between American and Japanese motorcycles.
5 Conclusion
Safeguard tari⁄s allow a country to raise trade barriers that are otherwise bound by trade agreements, in
order to provide temporary protection to an industry harmed by foreign competition. Safeguarding does not
require a ￿nding of unfair practices, as do antidumping and countervailing duties, and is supposed to apply to
imports from all countries.15 Two arguments have been put forth justifying safeguard actions (see Johnston,
1997). On the one hand, safeguards yield to the idea of limited import barriers for speci￿c industries as a
way to diminish protectionist pressure for a more drastic departure from liberalized trade. On the other,
since trade liberalization might force di¢ cult economic adjustments on particular sectors of the economy,
safeguards give industry some breathing room in which to become more e¢ cient. Despite many examples,
including those of the steel and apparel industries in the United States, indicating the ine¢ cacy of safeguard
protection in promoting the structural adjustment of industries, the H-D case is heralded as a success of the
escape clause. When H-D sought tari⁄ protection in 1982, the sole surviving American motorcycle company
was on the verge of bankruptcy: it held only ￿ve percent of the US market, lagging behind four Japanese
newcomers. In 1983, after receiving temporary import relief covering imports of heavy motorcycles, H-D￿ s
sales drastically recovered. Indeed, H-D recovered so swiftly that it even requested that the ￿nal year of
14Grossman (1986), Pindyck and Rotemberg (1987), and Kelly (1988) propose using econometric techniques to identify causes
of injury in safeguard cases. There are subtle di⁄erences between US trade law and WTO obligations regarding how to interpret
increased imports as ￿serious injury￿; see Irwin (2003) for details.
15The safeguard studied in this paper is in fact discriminatory in that quantitative restriction is applied. An analysis of the
optimal safeguard tari⁄-quota structure, though interesting, is beyond the scope of this paper.
17tari⁄ protection be cancelled.
In this paper, we examined the e⁄ects of US safeguard duties on heavy motorcycles in the 1983￿ 1987
period. We performed quantitative analyses to assess ex post the extent to which the motorcycle safeguards
improved H-D￿ s performance. Our simulation results revealed that safeguard tari⁄s explained at most 13
percent of H-D￿ s sales recovery. The ￿nding of this tiny safeguard e⁄ect was largely due to estimates obtained
from a random-coe¢ cient demand model, indicating that American and Japanese motorcycles were poorly
matched substitutes for each other. The estimated small cross-price elasticities appeared consistent with the
observation in our data that both H-D￿ s prices and sales increased faster than did the Japanese. Therefore,
safeguard tari⁄s would have had little e⁄ect in terms of shifting consumers from Japanese motorcycles to
American ones: rather, it must have been motorcycle non-price attributes that were e⁄ective in H-D￿ s
turnaround. Indeed, after it was bought by its management and became independent of AMF in 1981,
H-D quickly overhauled and renovated its production system. It implemented a statistical control system
that prompted employees to judge the quality of their own output, a just-in-time inventory program that
improved its production e¢ ciency, and massive layo⁄s that halved its workforce.
It is not di¢ cult to infer from the paper￿ s analysis that the welfare consequence of the safeguard tari⁄s
to the US economy. While the safeguards increased sales pro￿t for H-D and tari⁄ revenues on Japanese
imports, the total amount is summed up to be at USD 345 million in the study period, on the basis of the
information shown in Table 5. The above estimate, which must overstate the bene￿ts from the safeguards
policy, appears to be smaller than the loss of consumer welfare arising from the price e⁄ect found in Table 4.
16 This result is contrary to the result based on the back-of-the-envelop calculations in Feenstra and Taylor
(2008: 336-339), which infers that the safeguard tari⁄s on H-D improved welfare.
The paper provides us with an interesting lesson: that the coincidence between the period of safeguard
relief and that of H-D￿ s recovery does not constitute su¢ cient evidence of the e⁄ectiveness of the safeguard
policy. The argument for safeguard protection, that temporary relief from imports provides a breathing
space that allows domestic industries adversely a⁄ected by increased imports to revitalize, is thrown further
into doubt.
A Data Appendix
Motorcycle designs depend on the uses for which particular models are intended. O⁄-road machines, used
most extensively for recreation, have more robust frames with higher ground clearance, studded tires to
increase traction in mud and sand, various engine modi￿cations to ensure maximum torque rather than
16We use compensating variation to measure changes in consumer welfare from the safeguard protection. Compensating
variation is the amount a consumer would need to be just indi⁄erent between the equilibrium with the safeguard tari⁄s and the
one without them. The annual loss of consumer surplus is estimated approximately at USD 2 billion, but with a large standard
error of USD 1.2 billion (in 1983 prices).
18speed, and unmu› ed exhaust to increase power. On-road machines incorporate required safety equipment,
such as lights, rear-view mirrors, and signals: they are designed for high cruising speeds, rider comfort, and
good handling at high speeds. Combination or enduro machines are supposed to serve both functions, some
models being designed with a bias toward on-road use, others toward o⁄-road.
The safeguard tari⁄s implemented in 1983 applied to the on-road motorcycles on which this paper focuses.
The motorcycles with an engine displacement of 450 cc or larger are classi￿ed as on-road motorcycles. The
sources of data regarding such motorcycles are described below.
Sales quantity data (i.e., the number of new registrations) are obtained from the Motorcycle Statistics by
Make and Model published by R.L. Polk. To the best of our knowledge this publication is available only for
the 1983￿ 1987 period, and is archived at the US Library of Congress. This publication breaks down sales
quantity by make and model.
Motorcycle price and characteristics data are from the Motorcycle & Moped Appraisal Guide, a tri-annual
magazine published by the National Automotive Dealers Association. These data are available from 1977 to
1987. For the price variable, we employ the prime retail price, known to re￿ ect transaction prices. Listed
prices, or manufacturers suggested prices, could be another candidate, but they did not change over our
study period. To construct a representative data set, we focus on those motorcycles whose sales exceeded
200 units per period.
The motorcycle population is used in calculating the market size, and the income distribution of motor-
cycle owners is used in estimating motorcycle demand. Both types of data are obtained from the back issues
of Motorcycle Statistical Annual published by the Motorcycle Industry Council (MIC). The quantity data by
make (but not by model) for the 1977￿ 1995 period are also available from the MIC, and are used in Figures
1 and 4. The exchange rate data are from International Financial Statistics. The values and quantities of
US motorcycle imports are available from FT246 published by the US Census Bureau.
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21Sales Price No. Sales Price No.  Total  Sales
( % ) (USD) Models ( % ) (USD) Models (Unit)
1983 72.11 6831 15 27.89 4395 4 26675
1984 66.79 6636 19 33.21 4198 5 26636
1985 71.51 6771 18 28.49 3890 4 27564
1986 76.41 7128 31 23.59 3626 3 29940
1987 72.42 7115 44 27.58 3535 8 33426
Average 71.85 6896 25 28.15 3929 5 28848
Sales Price No. Sales Price No. Sales Price No.  Total  Sales
( % ) (USD) Models ( % ) (USD) Models ( % ) (USD) Models (Unit)
1983 2.64 4628 7 53.98 3187 42 43.38 2139 42 324652
1984 9.31 5089 8 27.74 2743 12 62.95 1970 28 305399
1985 14.60 5136 9 21.68 3011 12 63.72 2052 34 231966
1986 15.18 5347 13 22.77 3263 14 62.05 2161 33 186820
1987 14.50 5500 12 24.59 3355 11 60.91 2287 26 191496
Average 11.25 5140 10 30.15 3112 18 58.60 2122 33 248067
Notes:
  Harley-Davidson made no motorcycle below 700cc in the period studied in the paper.
  Price is CPI-deflated in the year of 1983.
  Sales are the number of motorcycles newly registered in a particular year, and price is the quantity-
weighted average by engine-displacement size.
TABLE 1




1100cc- 700-1099cc 450-699ccVariables Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err.
Price -1.23 
a 0.06 -12.60 
a 0.48 -56.04 
b 22.96
Mean Parameters (β)
Engine Displacement -0.89 
a 0.29 1.41 1.04 4.52
 b 2.09
Dryweight 1.96 
b 0.76 10.78 
a 4.18 14.21
 a 4.73
Forward Speeds 0.36 
a 0.07 0.60 
a 0.10 0.63 
a 0.11
Cylinder 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.08 -0.08 0.10
Age -0.03 
a 0.004 -0.06 
a 0.01 -0.08 
a 0.02
Constant -9.05 
a 0.46 -12.05 
a 1.37 -12.59 
a 1.66
Harley-Davidson -0.58 
b 0.24 1.11 0.72 -0.17 1.26
Harley-Davidson * Trend 0.49 
b 0.22 0.52 
c 0.31 0.55 0.47
Harley-Davidson * (Trend)
2 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.08
Std. Deviations (σ)
Engine Displacement -- -- 3.20 
b 1.35
Constant - - - - 1.00 0.67







   The superscripts, a, b, and c indicate significance at the 99-, 95-, and 90-confidence levels.
   The variables of engine displacement and dryweight are divided by 1000. The price variable in 
(2-1) and (2-2) are divided by 10000. Note that the price variable in (2-3) is divided by simulated
 individual income. We include a seasonal dummy variable, and yearly trend and its squared variables















a (12) 19.41 
c (12)Models Engine FXSB FXWG XLH1000 XLX1000 KZ550 CB650 VF750 VT750 VF1100 GL1100
Displacement (cc)
H-D FXSB 1340 -9.476 0.046 0.036 0.032 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.008
H-D FXWG 1340 0.050 -9.452 0.039 0.035 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.009
H-D XLH1000 1000 0.025 0.026 -7.395 0.027 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006
H-D XLX1000 1000 0.018 0.019 0.022 -7.437 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Kawasaki KZ550 553 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.015 -4.238 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.018
Honda CB650 655 0.026 0.026 0.034 0.035 0.047 -4.792 0.047 0.048 0.050 0.043
Honda VF750 748 0.044 0.045 0.054 0.056 0.072 0.073 -5.449 0.073 0.075 0.071
Honda VT750 749 0.017 0.018 0.023 0.025 0.033 0.033 0.033 -5.264 0.035 0.030
Honda VF1100 1100 0.015 0.016 0.023 0.025 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.034 -7.043 0.029
Honda GL1100 1100 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.058 0.069 0.071 0.075 0.070 0.069 -7.802
Notes:
This table lists the two best selling models in 1983 for each of the five categories by engine displacement shown in Table 1. Note that H-D
did not have models in the category of 450-699cc. Thus, this table shows four H-D and six Japanese models. The (m, n) element in the 
matrix indicates elasticity of model n with respect to a change in the price of model m.
TABLE 3
Own and Cross Elasticities
for Selected Models700-1099cc 1100cc- 450-699cc 700-1099cc 1100cc-
(Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
1983 -0.09 (0.33) -0.08 (0.20) -2.80 (0.52) 17.94 (0.79) 18.19 (0.53)
1984 0.02 (0.09) 0.09 (0.41) -1.93 (0.77) 23.83 (1.14) 24.88 (0.74)
1985 0.07 (0.28) 0.06 (0.25) -1.71 (0.43) 17.31 (0.81) 17.77 (0.54)
1986 0.04 (0.27) 0.01 (0.14) -0.73 (0.23) 12.63 (0.49) 13.03 (0.36)
1987 0.02 (0.07) 0.01 (0.05) -0.65 (0.18) 11.57 (0.46) 11.84 (0.36)
Average 0.01 (0.33) 0.02 (0.21) -1.76 (0.43) 16.66 (0.74) 17.14 (0.51)
Notes:
Stadard errors are shown inside parenthesis.
Japanese Makers include Honda, Yamaha, Suzuki, and Kawasaki. Each value in the table is calculated by:
  
in which, simulated prices are obtained by the procedure described in Section 4.
Harley-Davidson manufactured no motorcycles with the range between 450 and 699 cc.
100*(Actual Prices - Simulated Prices) / Actual Price
TABLE 4
Comparison between Actual and Simulated Prices
Harley-Davidson Japanese Makers
by Make and Engine DisplacementHarley-Davidson
Actual Sales Actual Profits Effect on Sales % Effect on Profit % Effect on Sales % Effect on Profit %
( Units ) (Million USD) ( Std. Error ) ( Std. Error ) ( Std. Error ) ( Std. Error )
1983 26675 18.10 8.92 (5.46) 7.96 (5.51) 7.74 (4.66) 6.94 (4.73)
1984 26636 18.55 11.50 (7.70) 12.40 (7.50) 10.37 (6.71) 11.28 (6.50)
1985 27564 18.86 3.92 (3.68) 4.65 (3.87) 3.67 (3.48) 4.38 (3.63)
1986 29940 21.47 2.39 (2.20) 2.42 (2.19) 2.28 (2.08) 2.31 (2.05)
1987 33426 25.71 1.09 (1.25) 1.10 (1.25) 1.05 (1.16) 1.06 (1.16)
Average 28848 20.54 5.57 (3.71) 5.71 (3.56) 5.02 (3.32) 5.20 (3.18)
Japanese Makers
1983 324652 134.81 -61.56 (36.49) -62.92 (33.58) -57.96 (31.86) -63.16 (29.63)
1984 305399 115.31 -62.86 (41.01) -64.73 (39.16) -60.37 (36.90) -64.76 (35.17)
1985 231966 99.614 -50.92 (30.18) -53.64 (29.01) -49.06 (28.13) -53.64 (26.96)
1986 186820 81.38 -36.73 (17.83) -39.30 (17.46) -35.47 (16.94) -39.26 (16.53)
1987 191496 78.30 -28.70 (12.12) -31.04 (12.00) -27.76 (11.73) -30.98 (11.53)
Average 248067 101.88 -48.15 (32.47) -50.33 (30.27) -46.12 (29.07) -50.32 (27.37)
Note:
 Simulated sales and profits are calculated under the assumption that all Japanese motorcycles sold in the U.S. were subject to the 
normal tariff of 4.4 percent in the period from 1983 to 1987.
 Actual profits are calculated under the assumption of Bertrand competition described in Section 4.1.
12.84
Collusion among the Japanese
Effects of Safeguard Tariffs on Sales and Profits
TABLE 5
Bertrand CompetitionNote: The Harley-Davidson's market share increased as US sales, along with US imports of large-scale motorcycles, declined during the safeguard period.
Figure 1
U.S Motorcycles Market






























%Note: Tariff rates were subject to safeguards. The annual average prime retail prices of Harley-Davidson increased much faster than those of Japanese models.
FIGURE 2




























Japanese (700cc-Note: The number of new Harley-Davidson models increased during the safeguard period, while that of Japanese models stagnated.
FIGURE 3
Number of New Motorcycle Models








1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Number of
New Models
Japanese with
700cc or larger
Harley-Davidson
Japanese with
less than 700cc